Sleep-wake protocols are critical in sensor networks to ensure long-lived operation. However, an open problem is how to develop efficient mechanisms that can be incorporated with sleep-wake protocols to ensure both longlived operation and a high degree of security. Our contribution in this paper is to address this problem by using local monitoring, a powerful technique for detecting and mitigating control and data attacks in sensor networks. In local monitoring, each node oversees part of the traffic going in and out of its neighbors to determine if the behavior is suspicious, such as, unusually long delay in forwarding a packet. Here, we present a protocol called SLAM to make local monitoring parsimonious in its energy consumption and to integrate it with any extant sleep-wake protocol in the network. The challenge is to enable sleep-wake in a secure manner even in the face of nodes that may be adversarial and not wake up nodes responsible for monitoring its traffic. We prove analytically that the security coverage is not weakened by the protocol. We perform simulations in ns-2 to demonstrate that the performance of local monitoring is practically unchanged while listening energy saving of 30 to 129 times is achieved, depending on the network load.
Introduction
It has been shown in the literature that sensor networks are vulnerable to a wide range of security attacks including the wormhole attack, rushing, and Sybil attacks [25] . Cryptographic mechanisms alone can not prevent these attacks since many of them such as the wormhole and the rushing attacks can be launched without needing access to cryptographic keys or violating any cryptographic check. To mitigate such attacks, many researchers have used the concept of cooperative local monitoring within a node's neighborhood ( [17] - [24] ). In local monitoring, nodes oversee part of the traffic going in and out of their neighbors. Different types of checks are done locally on the observed traffic to make a determination of malicious behavior. For the systems where arriving at a common view is important, the detecting node initiates a distributed protocol to disseminate the alarm. Many protocols have been built on top of local monitoring for intrusion detection (e.g., [16] [17] ), building trust and reputation among nodes (e.g. [20] [21]), protecting against control and data traffic attacks (e.g. [22] - [25] ) and in building secure routing protocols (e.g. [18] [19] [23] ). Specifically, in [23] and [24] the authors have presented a technique for detection of control and data attacks in ad-hoc networks using local monitoring. Control attacks are launched by a node delaying, dropping, modifying, or fabricating control traffic that it is supposed to forward. Data attacks are similarly launched by performing these actions on data traffic. In [23] and [24] , these attacks are detected by a group of nodes, called guard nodes, that perform local monitoring. The guard nodes are normal nodes in the network and perform the basic operations of sensing, in addition to monitoring.
Though local monitoring has been proposed by many researchers, it incurs a high energy cost since it requires the guard nodes to be awake all the time to oversee network behavior. To the best of our knowledge, no one has devised sleep-wake protocols for optimizing the energy overhead of monitoring while maintaining the quality of the monitoring service. This is the problem we address in this paper. The main challenge lies in having the sleep-wake performed securely so that an adversarial node cannot escape detection by causing its guard nodes to stay asleep.
In this paper we propose a set of mechanisms called Sleep-Wake Aware Local Monitoring (SLAM) that adapt the existing local monitoring technique to significantly reduce the time a node needs to be awake for the purpose of monitoring. The proposed mechanism adapts itself depending on the kind of sleeping protocol used in the network, henceforth referred to as the baseline sleeping protocol (BSP). For networks that use synchronized sleeping algorithms (e.g., [3] [8]- [10] ), i.e., nodes wakeup and go to sleep in a synchronized manner, SLAM does not need to do anything since a node and its guards will be woken up by the BSP itself. There exist several application-specific sleeping algorithms, for example, to maintain a given sensing coverage (each point should be sensed by at least k nodes) or a given network connectivity level (each pair of nodes should have k disjoint paths). For these protocols (e.g., [1] - [3] ), SLAM can support local monitoring by modifying an input parameter to the existing sleeping algorithm, such as the value of k in the connectivity or coverage preserving BSPs. Finally, we consider networks that use on-demand sleep-wake. On-demand sleep-wake means a node wakes up when it needs to communicate, and since the communication pattern can be arbitrary, the wakeup time is arbitrary in the general case. This provides the most challenging case and forms the most significant portion of the discussion in the paper.
For the third class of network, SLAM provides a generic on-demand sleeping algorithm, called On-Demand SLAM. This algorithm relies on each node having a passive or a low-power wake-up antenna in addition to the normal antenna. A node that is not involved in network activities, such as, data forwarding is ordinarily sleeping according to the BSP. However, for monitoring purposes, it is woken up on demand by a neighboring node using the wake-up antenna. The key challenge to this apparently simple scheme is that it now opens up the possibility of a new adversarial action, namely, a node not waking up a sleeping node(s) so that its own malicious action is not detectable. At a high level, our solution involves the following steps-adding to the list of behavior that a guard node needs to check and second, defining the mechanism through which the check is to be done (i.e., who checks, when, and for what).
We provide a theoretical analysis for energy saving using On-Demand SLAM compared to a baseline monitoring protocol [24] . We build a simulation model for SLAM using ns-2 and perform a comparative evaluation of local monitoring with and without SLAM. The results show that the security of local monitoring is very close in both cases while the overhead of SLAM in terms of listening energy is between 30 to 129 times lower, depending on the network traffic. The results show the effect of the number of malicious nodes, the traffic load, and the fraction of data being monitored on the overhead of local monitoring. We summarize our contributions in this paper as follows: 1. We provide a technique for conserving energy while performing local monitoring without significantly degrading its security performance. This we believe is fundamental to deploying local monitoring in any energy conscious network. 2. We propose a generic on-demand sleep-wake algorithm for network monitoring in scenarios where either no BSP exists or the sleep-wake is based on arbitrary communication pattern. 3. We analytically prove that SLAM does not add any vulnerability to the existing local monitoring technique. 4. We show through simulations a significant reduction in monitoring cost with negligible degradation in the monitoring quality of service. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related work in the field of sleep-wake protocols. Section 3 describes SLAM. Section 4 presents mathematical analysis of the energy overhead and security of SLAM. Section 5 presents the simulation experiments and results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related Work
Node sleeping is an important mechanism to prolong the life time of sensor networks. This topic has been discussed extensively in the literature and many protocols have been proposed for various types of applications such as object tracking ([1] [2] ). It has been realized that under current hardware designs, the maximum energy savings can be achieved through putting nodes to sleep-three orders of magnitude less current draw than in an idle node for the popular Mica mote platform for sensor nodes.
Primarily three different mechanisms are used to put nodes to sleep. The first is called synchronized wakeup-sleep scheduling in which the nodes in the network are put to sleep and woken up at the same time in a centralized (e.g., [10] ) or a distributed manner (e.g. [3] [8] [9] ). A disadvantage of such protocols is that the duty cycle is application dependent and not known a priori. Most importantly, they require the network to have an accurate time synchronization service. Furthermore, in scenarios with rare event detection, no event happens and the nodes enter sleep mode again in most of the wakeup periods. This means that nodes wake up too often resulting in wastage of energy. The second mechanism is based on selecting a subset of nodes to be woken up to maintain some properties in the network, such as sensing coverage (e.g., [4] [5]), network connectivity (e.g., [3] [6]), or both coverage and connectivity (e.g. [7] ).
The third mechanism is based on-demand sleep-wake protocols. These on-demand sleep-wake protocols use either special purpose low-power wake-up antennas (e.g., [11] -[14]) or passive wake-up antennas [15] . These antennas are responsible for receiving an appropriate beacon from a neighbor node and waking up the node for its full operation. Thus, for environments where events of interest are relatively rare, the time for the low power operation with the wake-up antennas being on, dominates. Further details about the operation of the antennas are mentioned in Section 3.3.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to address local monitoring in a network where nodes may need to be put to sleep for energy conservation.
SLAM Protocol Description
The primary goal of SLAM is to minimize the time a node has to be awake to perform local monitoring. Local monitoring is used to make sure that packets are not dropped, delayed, modified, misrouted, or forged along the path from source to destination [23] . SLAM adds one more task to the list of events that a guard node needs to monitor-verifying whether the node being monitored wakes up the requisite guards or fails to do so due to malicious motivations.
System Model and Assumptions
SLAM assumes that the network is static and the links are bi-directional. SLAM requires a pre-distribution pair-wise key management protocol (e.g. [26] ) such that any two nodes can acquire a key for encryption and authentication. In On-Demand SLAM, each node is equipped with either a passive [15] or a low-power wakeup antenna [12] . Any two nodes that need to communicate, establish a route between them using an underlying routing protocol. We assume that the source node is honest. No assumption is made about the adversary nodes following the sleep-wake protocol, only the honest nodes follow it. Each node knows its first-hop neighbors and the neighbors of each neighbor, e.g., using a technique as in [23] . The malicious behavior of fruitlessly sending a wake-up signal to a node is not addressed since this potential exists in any on-demand wake-up protocol and SLAM neither exacerbates nor solves this problem.
Different Network Models for SLAM Protocol
Depending on the BSP used in the network, SLAM has three different mechanisms for proposing sleeping for networks with local monitoring-The No-Action-Required SLAM protocol, the Adapted SLAM protocol, and the OnDemand SLAM protocol. The No-Action-Required SLAM is applicable in networks with synchronous sleep-wake mechanisms. Examples of such protocols include Span [3] , S-MAC [8] , and habitat monitoring [10] . The guards for the communication would also be woken up since the guards are one-hop neighbors of the two nodes that form the link on which the communication is taking place. The Adapted SLAM protocol is applicable in networks with applicationspecific sleep-wake protocols that can be adapted to wake up and sent to sleep guards as well. Examples of such protocols include those that maintain a k-sensing or a kcommunication coverage for given values of k [4] [5] [7] . The adaptation process depends in the protocol itself, but for the connectivity or coverage problems, it involves increasing the value of k input to the protocol such that the requisite number of guards is awake in any part of the sensor field. For more details on these two kinds of networks, please refer to Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of our technical report [29] .
The On-Demand SLAM Protocol
This protocol is used in a network that either has no BSP in operation or employs on-demand sleep-wake protocols. Therefore, we build a new sleep-wake protocol, called OnDemand SLAM that enables the guards to go to sleep when not required for monitoring. The approach we take is ondemand sleep-wake of the guards rather than scheduling the sleep-wake periods. The defining characteristic of ondemand sleep-wake protocols is that any node in the network may, at random, initiate communication with any other node in the network. The sleep-wake protocol does not rely on any fixed communication pattern in the network. OnDemand SLAM uses either low-power wake-up antennas (e.g., [11] -[14]) or passive antennas with circuitry that can harvest signal energy to trigger a node to wake up [15] , as has been described in Section 2. These kinds of antennas are commercially available (e.g. [14] ) as well as available as research prototypes in academia [15] . For example Austria Microsystems provides a low-power wake-up receiver (AS3931) with data rate of 2.731KB/s and current consumption in standby mode of 6.6µA [14] .
In On-Demand SLAM, the low-power wake-up radio remains awake all the time while the normal radio is put to sleep when it is not sending or receiving data or is not required for monitoring. If a node is to send a packet out, it simply wakes up by itself; if a neighbor node is to send a packet to this node, the sender will send a short wake-up beacon using the wake-up radio channel, and on receiving this beacon the wake-up radio triggers the normal radio to be ready for the reception. The main disadvantage of the mechanism is that it still consumes extra energy. Even though the power consumed is small compared to the normal antenna (1uW compared to 10mW in [11] ), the energy is non-negligible due to long time of operation.
Hence this mechanism has been modified to use passive wake-up antennas, known as radio-triggered power management mechanisms [15] . In this mechanism a special hardware component-a radio-triggered circuit-is connected to one of the interrupt inputs of the processor. The circuit itself does not draw any current and is thus passive. The node can enter sleep mode without periodic wake-up. The wake-up mode is the usual working mode with all the functional units ready to work, and the average wake-up mode current is 20mA. In sleep mode, a node shuts down all its components except the memory, interrupt handler, and the timer. The sleep mode current is 100µA. When a network node changes from sleep mode to wake-up mode, there is a surge current of 30mA for a maximum of 5ms. When a power management message is sent by another node within a certain distance, the radio-triggered circuit collects enough energy to trigger the interrupt to wake up the node. Except for activating the wake-up interrupt, the radiotriggered circuit is independent of any other components on the node. If supported by hardware, the wake-up packet is sent at a special radio frequency. If the nodes in a one hop neighborhood have unique frequencies each listens on, then other communication at a different radio frequency does not wake up the nodes. Note that hardware cost for adding multiple-frequency support is usually fairly low. Many recent low-end radio transceivers support multiple frequency operations [30] However, the unique frequency assignment is not necessary for the correctness of On-Demand SLAM, but improves the energy efficiency. In the rest of the paper, for ease of exposition we use the term "low-power wake-up radio" to mean either the low-power wake-up hardware or the passive wake-up hardware.
On-Demand SLAM: Basic Approach
The basic idea in designing On-Demand SLAM is for a node to wake up the requisite guard nodes to perform local monitoring on the communication that is going out from that node. The challenge in the design comes from the fact that any of the nodes (except the source) may be malicious and therefore, may not faithfully wake up the guards. As in [23] and [24] , local monitoring is used to mitigate malicious activities manifested through dropping, delaying, modifying, or forging of data/control packets. In local monitoring, the sensor node is called a guard when performing traffic overhearing and monitoring of neighbors. The guards of a node A over the incoming packets from a transmitter X are the common neighbors of X and A. In Figure 1 , α 1 and β 1 are the guards of n 1 over the link S n 1 . Information for each packet sent from X to A is saved in a watch buffer at each guard for a time T w . The information maintained depends on the attack to be detected (i.e., drop, delay, modify, or forge). A malicious counter (MalC(i,j)) is maintained at each guard node, i, for every node, j, which i is monitoring. MalC(i,j) is incremented for any suspect malicious activity of j that is detected by i. To account for intermittent natural failures, a node is determined to be misbehaving, only if the MalC goes above a threshold. When MalC(i,j) crosses the threshold, node i isolates node j by refraining from sending or receiving any packet from j. Node j is said to be fully isolated from the network when all its neighbors isolate it.
We use Figure 1 to explain On-Demand SLAM. A source node S is sending data to a destination node D through an hhop route S n 1 n 2 … n h-1 D. In a network where all the nodes are honest, S will wake up the next hop n 1 and the guard nodes (α 1 and β 1 ) before sending the packet to n 1 . In turn n 1 will wake up n 2 and guard nodes α 2 and β 2 before sending the packet on the next hop and so on, till the packet reaches D. Formally, according to [24] , the responsibility of a guard node α of n i+1 over a link n i →n i+1 is to verify that:
1. n i+1 forwards the packet within time T w. 2. n i+1 does not modify the packet it is forwarding. 3. n i+1 only forwards a packet if a packet is sent on the n i →n i+1 link. SLAM introduces a fourth responsibility. 4. n i+1 should wake up the guards for the n i+1 n i+2 link before forwarding the packet on that link. If a rule 1-3 is violated then the MalC value is incremented by appropriate amount; if rule 4 is violated, the MalC value increment is the maximum of the other MalC values because this rule violation may be used to mask violations of any of the rules 1-3.
In general, for any multi-hop route connecting a source node S to a destination node D, S is responsible for waking up the correct guards for n 1 , and n i is responsible for waking up the correct guards of n i+1 (1 ≤ i ≤ h-2). The correct guards for n 1 are guaranteed to be woken up by the assumption of honest source S and whether n i honestly wakes up the next hop guards is monitored by the guards of n i according to rule 4 above.
In the following we present two variations of On-Demand SLAM depending on the wake-up mechanism a node follows to wake up the guards of the next-hop.
Guards-Only On-Demand SLAM (G-SLAM)
The high level design goal in G-SLAM is to minimize the energy wasted in waking up nodes that can not serve as guards. On average half of the nodes within a single transmission range are not guards over a certain link (according to Equation I in [24] ). In G-SLAM, a node wakes up a subset of its neighbors-the nodes that can act as guards. For this, it is assumed that the wake-up antenna of each node is tuned to receive at its own code (as in [15] ), which is distinct for all one-hop neighborhood nodes.
For a guard node to verify honest wake-up, G-SLAM requires each node in the network to know, in addition to the identities of its first-hop and second-hop neighbors that are required by local monitoring, the location of each node within twice its transmission range. In Figure 1 , a guard of n 1 , say α 1 , knows the location of its neighbor n 1 and the location of all the neighbors of n 1 (S, β 1 , β 2 , α 2 and n 2 ). Using this information, α 1 knows the common neighbors of n 1 and n 2 , α 2 and β 2 , which can act as the guards of n 2 over the link n 1 n 2 . Therefore, α 1 can not be deceived by n 1 waking up its nodes that can not be guards for n 2 (S,β 1 ). A disadvantage of G-SLAM is that it requires sophisticated wakeup hardware that can be addressed using an id-attached beacon [15] .
We explain the G-SLAM algorithm with the help of Figure  1 . Assume that node S has some data to be sent for the destination D over the route S n 1 n 2 … n h-1 D connecting S to D. G-SLAM uses the following steps to wake up the correct guards along the route from S to D: 1. Node S sends a signal to wake up the first-hop node (n 1 ) and the guards for n 1 (α 1 , β 1 ). This is a multicast signal that contains the identities of n 1 , α 1 , and β 1 .
2. Node S sends the packets it has to n 1 following the timing schedule presented in Section 3.3.4.
3. Nodes n 1 , α 1 , and β 1 after being woken up continue to remain awake for T w . T w is a parameter of local monitoring that captures the maximum time by which an entry in the watch buffer is evicted (beyond that is evidence of malicious action). Each time a new packet is sent from S to n 1 , T w is reinitialized. After T w expires at a node, it goes back to sleep. 4. Node n 1 , after being woken up, uses the timing schedule in Section 3.3.4 and according to it sends a wake-up signal for n 2 , the guards of n 2 over the link n 1 →n 2 (α 2 , β 2 ), and the guards of n 1 over the link S n 1 (S,α 1 ,β 1 ).
The guards of n 1 over the link S→n 1 are responsible for verifying that n 1 fulfills this requirement. n 2 does not accept packets from n 1 if the wakeup signal of n 1 does not include all the necessary nodes (S,α 1 ,β 1 ,α 2 , β 2 ,n 2 ).
5. If n 1 fails to send the wakeup signal, the guard of n 1 with the lowest ID sends a two-hop broadcast of the wakeup signal. If that guard fails, the guard with the next smallest ID sends the signal, and so on. This design ensures that if there is a chain of colluding malicious nodes then all the nodes will be suspected. 6. The process continues at each step up to the destination.
All-Neighbors On-Demand SLAM (A-SLAM)
The high level design goal of A-SLAM is to relax the assumption that every node knows the location of its firsthop and second-hop neighbors, and to simplify the wake-up hardware and wakeup signal. Again considering Figure 1 , A-SLAM uses the following steps to wake up the guards along the route from S to D: 1. Node S broadcasts a wake-up signal to all its first-hop neighbors (Z,W,n 1 ,α 1 ,β 1 ). The wake-up signal includes the identity of both the current sender (S), the next-hop (n 1 ), and the previous-hop (empty for S). 2. Each neighbor of S, after being woken up, decides whether to stay awake or go back to sleep based on the role that it may play on the ongoing communication. If that neighbor is the next-hop (n 1 ), it stays awake to forward the data and to monitor the next-hop from it (n 2 ). If that neighbor is a guard (α 1 ,β 1 ) for the next-hop n 1 over the link n 1 n 2 , it stays awake to monitor the behavior of n 1 . If the node is a guard of a forwarding node over the previous-hop, it stays awake to detect fabrication by the forwarding node. A node can independently make this determination based on firstand second-hop neighbor information. If none of these cases hold, the node goes back to sleep immediately. 3. Node S sends the data packet to n 1 following the timing schedule presented in Section 3.3.4.
4. Nodes n 1 , α 1 , and β 1 after being woken up continue to stay awake for T w . After that, it goes back to sleep. 5. n 1 does the same steps that S did to wake up the nexthop (n 2 ), n 2 's guards (α 2 ,β 2 ) and n 1 's guards (S,α 1 ,β 1 ). 6. If n 1 fails to send the wakeup signal, the guard of n 1 with the lowest ID sends a two-hop broadcast of the wakeup signal through. If that guard fails, the guard with the next smallest ID sends the signal, and so on. This design ensures that if there is a chain of colluding malicious nodes then all the nodes will be suspected. 7. The process continues at each step till the destination.
This scheme results in an increase in the energy consumption compared to G-SLAM due to the needless wake-up of the neighbors that are not guards.
Timing of the wakeup signal
In this section we generate the timing schedules for sending the wake-up signal to nodes using On-Demand SLAM. This is important because the wake-up antennas have a warm-up period that could increase the end-to-end delay of the communication. We design the schedule such that the additional delay due to the sleep-wake protocol is not cumulative with the number of hops for Case II shown below. It is a constant independent of the number of hops. Moreover, the increase in delay with the number of hops is small for Case I. The coefficient of increase per hop is the difference between the time to send a control packet and the time to send a data packet over one hop.
Let T control be the time to send the signal to the wake-up antenna, T warmup be the time for a node to be fully awake from the time it receives the wake-up signal (5 ms for the antenna in [15] ), and T data be the time to send a data packet over one hop. This time includes the transmission time and the forwarding time. Thus, within T data , an intermediate node completely receives a data packet. Finally, let T wake be the time a node continues to be awake after being woken up.
Consider an isolated flow between S and D, separated by h hops. The intermediate nodes are n 1 , n 2 , …, n h-1 . Let g i represents the guards of node n i over the link n i-1 n i . Let v i represents the neighbors of n i that are not guards of n i+1 over the link n i n i+1 . Consider the following two disjoint cases based on the relation between (T control + T warmup ) and T data . Figure 2(a) shows the timing schedule for a node in the route between the source and the destination. The node, n 1 , wakes up at T 3 and goes to sleep at T 8 , where T 8 -T 3 = T data (to receive data) + τ (wait for the next-hop to be ready to receive the data) + T data (send the data to the next-hop) + {τ + T data } (as a guard for n 2 ) = 3T data +2τ. Figure 2(b) shows the timing schedule for a guard node. The guard, g 1 , wakes up at T 3 and goes to sleep at T 6 , where T 6 -T 3 = T data (to overhear incoming data to the node being monitored, n 1 ) + τ (wait for the next-hop to be ready to receive the data) + T data (to overhear outgoing data from the node being monitored, n 1 ) = 2T data +τ. Figure 2 (c) , only meaningful for A-SLAM, shows the schedule for a node that is a neighbor to a node in the route from the source to the destination but is not a guard node. The node, v 1 , wakes up at T 3 , determines that it can not be a guard, and thus goes back to sleep immediately.
From Figure 2 , it can be seen that per hop, the delay incurred is T control + T warmup and at the last hop, the delay due to data (T data ) gets exposed (see Equation (1) below). Case II: (T control +T warmup )≤T data ,τ = T data -(T control + T warmup ) Please see Case II, Section 3.4.3 of our technical report [29] .
Security and Performance Analysis

Security Analysis
We will prove the following proposition. Proposition: Due to the sleep-wake mechanism for guards in SLAM, no loss in detection coverage occurs w.r.t. [24] .
For this we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma: For any node n i in the path S→D (i =1, …, h-1), the guards for n i+1 on the link n i n i+1 are woken up when the communication over the link takes place. We prove this lemma using mathematical induction. Let the guards of n 1 over the link S n 1 form the set G 1 , n h-1 D the set G h , and n i-1 n i the set G i . Base case: The source S is honest and therefore it wakes the guard nodes in G 1 .
Inductive hypothesis: For n 1 , …, n i (i ≥ 1), ∀G k (k ≤ i) has been woken up at the time when the communication over the link n k-1 n k takes place either directly or indirectly. In the later case n k-1 is suspected of malicious action. To prove: G i+1 is woken up at the time of n i n i+1 communication.
Proof:
If n i is honest, it wakes up G i+1 (step 4 of G-SLAM/step 5 of A-SLAM). Else, G i wakes up G i+1 (step 5 of G-SLAM/step 6 of A-SLAM). In the later case n i is suspected of malicious action (not sending the wakeup signal).
Thus, the lemma is proved by mathematical induction. The detection of the guards according to rules 1-3 is not changed from baseline local monitoring. Combining the lemma with this observation proves that no loss of detection coverage happens due to SLAM.
Energy and End-to-End Delay Analysis
For both energy and delay we compare our scheme OnDemand Slam to bring out its worst case behavior. For endto-end delay, we compare it with local monitoring without sleep-wake (Baseline-LM). For the energy we compare it to a protocol with on-demand sleep-wake for communication and no monitoring (Baseline-OD).
In addition to the notations defined in Section 3.3.4, let A transmit be the current to transmit (at the middle of the transmit range), which is 27mA for Mica2 motes [28] . Let A warmup be the current consumed during the transition from sleep to wakeup (warm up), which is 30mA for Mica2 motes [15] . Finally, let A active be the current in the computationally active mode = the current in the idle listening mode = the current in receive mode (8mA for Mica2 motes). From Figure 2 it can be seen that delay at the first link (S n 1 ) is T control + T warmup + T data . Over each of the succeeding links, the delay is T control + T warmup since the delay due to data (T data ) gets exposed. This is due the sleep-wake schedule process that SLAM uses where the wake-up signal is sent at the earliest opportunity. Therefore, the end-to-end
The end-to-end delay in Baseline-LM is ( )
In this case, the additional end-to-end delay imposed by SLAM depends on the number of hops between S and D ( ) ( ) ( )
Case II: (T control + T warmup ) ≤ T data with τ = T data -(T control +
T warmup ).
The end-to-end delay of SLAM is given by ( ) ( 1)( )
For more details, please refer to Case II, Section 4.2 in our technical report.
In Figure 4 , we plot the extra delay of SLAM over Baseline-LM for cases I (Equation (3)) and II (Equation (12) in the technical report [29] ) above with T data = 7ms and τ = 1ms. The figure shows that the additional delay due to SLAM increases linearly with the number of hops for Case I while it remains constant for Case II. 
On-Demand SLAM: Here the sleep-wake protocol involves, in addition to S and D, the forwarding nodes, the guard nodes, the neighbors of the forwarding nodes that are not guards. We will compute separately for the three kinds of nodes (i) forwarding nodes; (ii) guard nodes that do not act as forwarders; (iii) remaining nodes. The energy of S and D is the same as that in Baseline-OD. i. Energy expended by a forwarding node n i (i = 1, …, h-
A active . The additional energy is consumed because n i has to find if n i+1 forwards the packet that it was just handed by n i . The inequality comes in because T w is the worst-case time in case n i+1 is malicious. ii. Energy expended by a guard node that is not a forwarding node ε g,SLAM ≤ T warmup . A warmup + T data . A active + T w . A active . Consider for example the guard g 1 of n 1 over the link S n 1 . g 1 has to listen to the communication between S to n 1 and then has to stay listening for a maximum of T w to see that n 1 forwarded the packet. iii. Energy expended by a node in the bounding box around S and D that is neither a forwarding node nor a guard node (the "other node", hence the notation "o" in the subscript). For G-SLAM where the wake-up signal is directed to the relevant guard nodes ε o,G-SLAM = 0. For A-SLAM ε o,A-SLAM = T warmup . A warmup . Case II: (T control + T warmup ) ≤ T data with τ = T data -(T control + T warmup ). Please refer to Case II, Section 4.2 in our technical report for the energy consumption of this case.
Simulation Results
We use the ns-2 simulator [27] to simulate a data exchange protocol over a network with local monitoring enabled. We simulate two scenarios individually without A-SLAM (the baseline) and with A-SLAM. The baseline is an implementation of a state-of-the-art local monitoring protocol presented in [24] . A-SLAM scenario is built on top of the baseline scenario to provide sleep-wake service for the guards. Nodes are distributed randomly over a square area with a fixed average node density, 100 nodes over 204m×204m. Each node acts as a source and generates data according to a Poisson process with rate µ. The destination is chosen at random and is changed using an exponential distribution with rate λ. A route is evicted if unused for TOut Route time. The experimental parameters are in Table 1 . The results are averages over 30 runs. The malicious nodes are randomly chosen so that they are more than 2 hops away. Adversary model: We are simulating a selective forwarding attack launched by a group of malicious nodes that collude and establish wormholes in the network [25] . During the wormhole attack, a malicious node captures packets from one location in the network, and "tunnels" them to another malicious node at a distant point, which replays them locally. This makes the tunneled packet arrive either sooner or with a lesser number of hops compared to the packets transmitted over normal multihop routes. This creates the illusion that the two end points of the tunnel are very close to each other. The two malicious end points of the tunnel may use it to pass routing traffic to attract routes through them and then launch a variety of attacks against the data traffic flowing on the wormhole, such as selectively dropping the data packets. Unless otherwise mentioned, each node selectively drops a packet passing through it with uniform probability of 0.6 Variable Input metrics: (i) Fraction of data monitored (f dat )-each guard node randomly monitors a given fraction of the data packets. At other times, it can be asleep from the point of view of a guard's responsibility.
(ii) Data traffic load (µ). (iii) Number of malicious nodes (M).
Output metrics: (i) Delivery ratio-the ratio of the number of packets delivered to the destination to the number of packets sent out by a node averaged over all the nodes in the network.
(ii) % wakeup time-the time a node has to wake up specifically to do monitoring averaged over all the nodes as a percentage of the simulation time; (iii) Average end-to-end delay-the time it takes a data packet to reach the final destination averaged over all successfully received data packets; (iv) % True isolation-the percentage of the total number of malicious nodes that is isolated; (v) % False isolation-the percentage of the total number of nodes that is isolated due to natural collisions on the wireless channel; (vi) Isolation latency-the time between when the node performs its first malicious action to the time by which all its neighbors have isolated it, averaged over all isolated malicious nodes. Note that our goal is not to show the variation of the output metrics with the input parameters for local monitoring, since that has been covered in [23] [24] . Our goal is to study the relative effect on local monitoring with A-SLAM and without.
Effect of fraction of data monitored
The amount of data traffic is typically several orders of magnitude larger than the amount of control traffic. It may not be reasonable for a guard to monitor all the data traffic in its monitored links. Therefore, a reasonable optimization is to monitor only a fraction of the data traffic. In this set of experiments, we investigate the effect of this optimization. Figure 5 shows the variations of delivery ratio, % true isolation, and end-to-end delay as we vary f dat . Figure 5(a) shows that the delivery ratio is almost stable above 90% irrespective of the value of f dat . This desirable effect is achieved by proper selection of the MalC increment for each value of f dat . The MalC increment is designed with an inverse relation to the f dat Figure 5(b) shows that the % of true isolation is almost stable as we vary f dat due to the same reasoning as for Figure 5(a) . Importantly, the delivery ratio and the % true isolation in A-SLAM are close to the baseline for all values of f dat . However, in Figure 5 , the results of A-SLAM are slightly worse than those of the baseline. This is because some of the data packets are additionally dropped in A-SLAM by forwarding, destination, or guard nodes that happen to be asleep when the data packet arrives. This erroneous extra sleep may occur due to collision in the sleep-wake control channel which prevents the respective nodes from waking up. Although the control channel is a separate channel contention still occurs, where a guard of two consecutive links are sent separate wake-up signals concurrently. Figure  5 (c) shows that the end-to-end delay is slightly higher for A-SLAM due to the additional warm up time required when the source sends a packet to the first hop. Figure 6 above shows the variations of % delivery ratio, % true isolation, and % false isolation as we vary the number of malicious nodes (M). Figure 6(a) shows that the % delivery ratio slightly decreases as M increases. This is due to the packets dropped before the malicious nodes are detected and isolated. As the number of malicious nodes increases, this initial drop increases and thus the delivery ratio decreases. Figure 6(b) shows that the % true isolation also slightly decreases as we increase M. This is because the number of available guards in the network decreases as more and more nodes get compromised. These two metrics in A-SLAM are slightly lower than those of the base line due to the erroneous extra sleep described in Section 5.1. Figure 6(c) shows that the % false isolation increases as we increase M. This is because not all guard nodes come to the decision to isolate a malicious node at the same time. Thus, a guard node may suspect another guard node when the latter isolates a malicious node but the former still has not. The occurrence of this situation increases with M and hence the % of false isolation increases with M. For example, a guard node G 1 detects a malicious node Z earlier than the other guard nodes for the link to Z. G 1 subsequently drops all the traffic forwarded to Z and is therefore suspected by other guard nodes for Z. This problem can be solved by having an authenticated one-hop broadcast whenever a guard node performs a local detection. The % false isolation in A-SLAM is lower than that of the baseline. Again, this is due to some of the packets that may falsely identify a node as malicious may get lost in A-SLAM due to the erroneous extra sleep.
Effect of number of malicious nodes
Wakeup time variations
In this section, we study the effect of varying the fraction of data monitored (f dat ), the number of malicious nodes (M), and the data traffic load (1/µ) on the percentage of time that a node needs to stay awake for monitoring using A-SLAM. Figure 7 (a) shows that the percentage of wakeup time required for monitoring increases as the fraction of monitored data increases due to the increase in the number of data packets that a node needs to overhear in its neighborhood. Figure 7(b) shows that the percentage of wakeup time decreases as we increase the number of malicious nodes. As the number of malicious nodes increases, the number of data packets in the system decreases since the malicious nodes are isolated and disallowed from generating data packets. Therefore, the number of packets that need to be monitored decreases, which results in a decrease in the average percentage of wakeup monitor time. Figure 7(c) shows that the average % of monitoring wakeup time increases as the data traffic load increases due the increase in data that needs to be monitored. 
Effect of distance on delay
In this section, we evaluate the variations of the end-toend delay with the number of hops between the source and destination pairs. Figure 8 above shows that the end-to-end delay in A-SLAM is always higher than that of the baseline due to the warm-up time needed to wake up the nodes before sending the data. However, due the scheduling strategy in A-SLAM in which each node sends a wake-up signal at the earliest possible opportunity (Section 3.3.4), the warm-up time is only in the critical path at the first hop and therefore, the difference in delay between A-SLAM and the baseline case is not cumulative with the number of hops. The trend of the additional delay due to SLAM follows the trend obtained analytically in Section 4.2 for the case when (T control + T warmup ) < T data which is true in these simulation settings.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a protocol called SLAM to make local monitoring in sensor networks energy-efficient while maintaining the detection coverage. We classify the domain of sleep-wake protocols into three classes and SLAM correspondingly has three manifestations depending on which baseline sleeping protocol (BSP) is used in the network. For the first class (synchronized sleep-wake), local monitoring needs no modification. For the second class (connectivity or coverage preserving sleep-wake), local monitoring can call the BSP with changed parameter values. For the third class (on-demand sleep-wake), adapting local monitoring is the most challenging and requires hardware support as low-power or passive wake-up antennas. We propose a scheme whereby before communicating on a link, a node awakens the guard nodes responsible for local monitoring on its next hop. We design the scheme to work with adversarial node behavior. We prove analytically that On-Demand SLAM does not weaken the security property of local monitoring. Simulation experiments bring out that over a wide range of conditions, the performance of local monitoring with SLAM is comparable to that without SLAM, while listening energy savings of 30-129 times is realized, depending on the network load. Our ongoing work is looking at providing security guarantees in mobile ad hoc networks and building trust framework for such networks.
